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SUMMARY

The United States and Canada two of the world's foremost modern, liberalized societies regularly combat an awkward
andpainful tension between free speech rights and the wellbeing of
minors. Though there generally exists a consensus that child
pornography represents a certain dark realm of material outside
the oft-amorphous protections afforded speech, the establishment
of an acceptable working definition of this criminal fodder has
proven contentiously difficult. This paper explores each nation's
struggles with this tension, through the lens of legislative efforts,
judicial responses, and the productions that seem to perennially
blur the line between art and crime. It is ultimately this paper's
contention that existing child pornography statutes would be
wisely supplanted by the enforcement of other law already in
existence.
. University of Wisconsin-Madison (B.A., with honors in the
major, 2006);
University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2009).
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"The only other kind of movies I did was x-ratedfilms,
but I was a teenager, I was a kid then.
I don't really remember any of it,
and I don't really think about any of it."
-Nora Kuzma (aka Traci Lords)
Larry King Live
March 16, 1990

A. INTRODUCTION

A United Press International dispatch from November 27,
1980 notes, "New World-Mutual Pictures announced Volker
Schlondorff, director of the film which won Cannes and Academy
awards, was 'extremely pleased' with the Ontario Censor Board's
decision to approve the film with a restricted rating."' The movie
in question was Tin Drum, a widely-lauded cinematic tale based
on a best-selling novel. 2 As a condition of granting such approval,
the provincial government organization demanded two scenes be
3
spliced out of the movie.
Seventeen years later, the same film would come under
fire in Oklahoma, where police took to confiscating copies of the
acclaimed foreign production after a state judge ruled it to violate
child pornography laws. 4 The crackdown was so severe that
officers took to examining video store rental logs and arresting
"customers who had rented the film in early 1997." 5 Patrons of a
library who checked out the tape were greeted at their homes by

'Untitled, UnitedPress International,Nov. 27, 1980.
Gary Arnold, A Sadly Different Drum; The Failed Effort to Depict Grass'

2

Novel, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 25, 1980, at C1.
3 See Untitled, supra note 1.

4 Jay Hughes, Judge: Video Not Pornographic,CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Oct. 22,

1998, Features, at 37.

5 Scott Hettrick, VSDA Prevails in 'Drum' Case, THE HOLLYWOOD

Dec. 23, 1998.
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plainclothes policemen. 6 Concluding a legal battle that lasted
some eighteen months, a federal judge deemed the film to not
violate the state's child pornography laws, after earlier declaring
7
the seizures unconstitutional.
A profound distinction exists between the variety of blackmarket fodder that chronicles the exploitation of helpless children
for purposes of perverse consumption and a genuinely artistic
undertaking like Tin Drum that captures mainstream cinematic
awards in Europe and North America alike. Yet, that film's edgy
depictions - most notably a scene portraying a minor engaged in
oral sex 8 - led authorities in Canada and the United States to
essentially conflate this meaningful distinction. While Ontario's
censorship and Oklahoma's banning may prove radically different
means of addressing a common "problem," the reality is that each
connotes a chilling sense of Orwellian behavior.
The critical inquiry, borne out of the prolonged saga of Tin
Drum as well as numerous other incidents, is twofold: Whether
Canada and the United States may abrogate speech rights so as to
ban child pornography and, if so, just how each nation may go
about defining properly the resultant prohibited realm of material.
This article will explore the relevant postures of both countries,
emphasizing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition9 and R. v. Sharpe,10
recent cases that helped define the permissive contours of both
Canadian and American" free speech law with regard to child
6 HMH Awards: this year 'sfirstamendment champs,

PLAYBOY,

March 1999, at

45.
7 See Hughes, supra note 4.
8

id.

' Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
'0 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2 (Can.).

" The term "American," literally and most broadly, may be understood to
reference the entirety of that land between northernmost outpost of Nunavut,
Canada and southernmost point of Ushuaia, Argentina and neighboring Chile. It
is, however, common parlance in both Canada and the United States to embrace
this term as a specific reference to the people, customs, and goings-on of the
latter nation. Accordingly, this article will use the term in this narrower context,
meaning not to proceed in ignorance toward the larger usage but, rather,
proceeding out of a simple linguistic convenience.
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pornography. The issues encompassing this remarkably dark area
of law are, in many ways, uniquely compelling inasmuch as they
pit liberalized Western views of free speech against long-held
social and legal principles that prioritize the protection of children
as especially vulnerable members of society. While the requisite
correlative balancing act is an inherently nuanced endeavor, it
shall be the contention of this article that the appropriate
jurisprudential and philosophical remedy is to emphasize the
criminalization of those various acts that inherently give rise to
the creation of child pornography, treating the resultant material
as evidence in lieu of contraband.

B. BACKGROUND: PORNOGRAPHY V. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio,12 Justice Stewart
famously observed of pornography, "I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it."13 Neither the United States nor Canada offers a formal
definition of "pornography," though each country has delineated
a means of determining that which is considered to be legally
obscene. The Canadian standard, as noted in the Report of the
Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, 14 is
statutorily derived:
The Criminal Code does not use the word
pornography in its prohibitions dealing with
offensive material. Subsections 159(1) and 159(2)(a)
deal with the production, distribution and sale of
"obscene" matter. Subsection 159(8) provides that
12Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
13Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14 PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION IN CANADA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, Vol. 1 (1985)
"FRASER REPORT"].

[hereinafter
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for purposes of the Code, any publication "a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue
exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of
the following subjects, namely crime, horror,
15
cruelty and violence" is deemed to be obscene.
The American standard, however, originates largely from case law
and is far more complex.
In Roth v. United States,16 the Supreme Court 17 delineated a
test for determining that which is obscene: "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest."1 8 This standard would later be slightly
modified in Miller v. California,19 where a three prong test was
established:
(a) whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
20
value.

15Id. at 45-46.

16Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
17Inasmuch as this article addresses cases decided by both the Supreme Court of
the United States and the Supreme Court of Canada, the former institution shall
be denoted by its proper name and, periodically, simply as the "Supreme Court;"
the latter court will be recognized as the "Supreme Court of Canada" or the
"Canadian Supreme Court."
18 Roth, 343 U.S. at 489.
19Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).

20
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The crux of the Miller test is twofold: any suspect works must be
examined macroscopically, and the concept of "obscenity" is
limited to material of a sexual nature. This is important inasmuch
as while social vernacular occasionally permits the deeming of
particular acts of violence or other moral offense to be
"pornographic," the legal scope of the term is limited to prurient
works.
Given the contextual demands of both the Canadian and
American definitions of obscenity, it becomes evident that child
pornography - logically a subset of pornography and, ergo, a
subset of obscenity - must entail different considerations. Western
social norms dictate that while sexual acts involving consenting
adults, when taken as part of a larger artistic work, may not
constitute obscenity, similar acts performed by children are not as
easily dismissed. Yet the per se disallowance of such matter,
regardless of context, would do little more than recreate the
aforementioned Tin Drum dilemma.
Accordingly, "child pornography" must be something
more than the mere existence of children in pornographic - or
obscene - material, inasmuch as that which would not otherwise
be deemed "obscene" has the potential to become horrific when
produced with children. Even aside from the public interest in
protecting from exploitation those not sufficiently mature to offer
consent, an important legal distinction does exist: sexual acts, even
of a tremendously prurient caliber, are traditionally allowed
between consenting adults, 21 whereas a prohibition exists on the
involvement of children in such acts.
The Criminal Code of Canada renders guilty of an offense:
"Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or
indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of
21

There are, of course, certain circumstances in which the law tends to prohibit

consensual sexual acts between consenting adults - incest and, in some states,
adultery, being notable examples. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10501 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-202 (2002). These prohibitions,
however, derive from a radically different line of legal and social reasoning, and

their basis is well outside the topical scope of this article.
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the body of a person under the age of 16 years." 22 In the United
States, the specific statutory rape laws vary by state, however, by
way of anecdote, the Texas Penal Code provides:
A person commits an offense if, with a child
younger than 17 years and not the person's spouse,
whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the
person: (1) engages in sexual contact with the child
or causes the child to engage in sexual contact; or
(2) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person: (A) exposes the person's anus or any
part of the person's genitals, knowing the child is
present; or (B) causes the child to expose the child's
23
anus or any part of the child's genitals.
The applicable prohibition in the District of Columbia provides,
"Whoever, being at least 4 years older than a child, engages in a
sexual act with that child or causes that child to engage in a sexual
act shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life and, in
addition, may be fined an amount not to exceed $ 250,000."24
These laws are critical to an understanding of child
pornography and its regulation, in that this particularly odious
form of "speech" meaningfully differs from the traditional scope
of obscenity inasmuch as the underlying act portrayed is
criminally punishable unto itself. In this regard, it is important to
distinguish between such portrayals of a documentary and
fictitious nature. The former variety of child pornography is
evidence of an act (or acts) criminalized in the United States and
Canada; the latter is merely the dramatic presentation of such an
act (or acts) as imagined. Proceeding into an examination of
applicable case law, this distinction is essential.

22 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 151 (2000).
23 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (2007).

24 D.C. CODE § 22-3008 (2008).
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C. CANADA'S CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW

Under the umbrella of "Offences Tending to Corrupt
Morals," 25 26 the Criminal Code of Canada addresses child
pornography in detail. A precise definition of this core term is
offered in four parts, each deserving of some parsing herein. The
first encompasses:
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual
representation, whether or not it was made by
electronic or mechanical means, (i) that shows a
person who is or is depicted as being under the age
of eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted
as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or (ii) the
dominant characteristic of which is the depiction,
for a sexual purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal
27
region of a person under the age of eighteen years
This language does not merely touch upon literal acts but, indeed,
dramatically imagined acts as well. The repetitive use of "or is
depicted as being" shows the Canadian statute interprets child
pornography to be more than the mere documentation of
otherwise-illegal exploitive conduct. The above wording also
encompasses material that while not depictive of a sexual act,
serves to arouse a sexual interest, or that, while otherwise a legal
sexual act, is illegal because of its focus. Again, this is significant
in that it brings into the realm of child pornography that which is
otherwise permissible when not visually memorialized - the mere
depiction of a child's sexual organ, a natural component of the
human body, is criminalized here (provided such be "for a sexual
purpose").
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1 (1985).
26 In an attempt to preserve the dignity and veracity of several quotations in this
25

article, various words common to the English language are spelled with slight
differences attributable to the varying literary customs of the United States and

Canada.
27

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1)(a) (1985).
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The code next prohibits, "any written material, visual
representation or audio recording that advocates or counsels
sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that
would be an offence under this Act."28 This aspect proves
intriguing because it serves to prohibit not an actual act but,
rather, the mere advocacy of such an act. In a sense, this provision
conflates the encouragement of acts of child pornography with
literal acts of child pornography. Moreover, the statute does not
demand that anything come of such advocacy - this language is
not tantamount to American "fighting words" prohibitions 29 in
that there is no requirement that an ensuing act of illegality be
likely, nor is it akin to a classic "conspiracy" charge 30 in that no act
in furtherance of the advocated wrongdoing is required.
The third body of material deemed by the Criminal Code
of Canada to constitute child pornography is, "any written
material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a
sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of
eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act." 31 This
element is, in essence, a hybrid of the previous two components the "dominant characteristic" language from the first sub-section
is again used here to insert a subjective threshold, while the
literary emphasis of the second sub-section controls the variety of
content in question. Yet this language seems rather unnecessary in
that the prohibition on advocacy of such acts contained in the
previous provision appears to encompass in part the same
material that is banned here. Indeed, one could easily contend any
literary description, crafted to serve a prurient interest, is the
inherent promotion of its very contents. Only the most fantastical
of propagations would seem outside this scope, and even then it
may seem that the "dominant characteristic" ceases to be the
sexual act in question and commences to be whatever foundation

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1)(b) (1985).
29 See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
30 See generally Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
31 R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1)(c) (1985).
28
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gives rise to such a heightened departure from the permissive
contours of reality.
The final variety of child pornography outlined by this
statute is "any audio recording that has as its dominant
characteristic the description, presentation or representation, for a
sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of
eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act." 32 This
language is the simplest to address in that it does not significantly
or meaningfully deviate from the third provision. The only
distinction is that this component addresses audio recordings in
lieu of written material - the same impact is felt and the same
issues exist.
The statute goes on to prohibit, with varying
accompanying terms of imprisonment, the creation of child
33
pornography, its distribution, its possession and its access. It is
considered an aggravating factor if "the person committed the
34
offence with intent to make a profit."
Next, the Criminal Code of Canada addresses potential
defenses to violations of these laws. The statute provides:
It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (2)
in respect of a visual representation that the
accused believed that a person shown in the
representation that is alleged to constitute child
pornography was or was depicted as being
eighteen years of age or more unless the accused
took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of that
person and took all reasonable steps to ensure that,
where the person was eighteen years of age or
more, the representation did not depict that person
35
as being under the age of eighteen years.

32

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1)(d) (1985).

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(2)-(4) (1985).
34 R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(4.3) (1985).
35 R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(5) (1985).
33
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In essence, this language amounts to a disallowance of any
defenses premised on willful ignorance of the prohibited nature of
the subject material. However, where there is a genuine mistake of
fact - i.e., where a citizen investigates the nature of a prohibited
article and is truly led to believe s/he is bearing witness to a work
that centers on an adult, not a child - this defense is allowed.
This scenario, which is simply a good faith mistake of fact
with regard to the age of a pornographic subject, has played out
before in the adult entertainment industry. In 1986, it was learned
that Nora Kuzma, a prominent adult movie actress who worked
under the name "Traci Lords," was in fact under the age of 18
36
during the filming of several productions in which she starred.
The deception in this instance was so thoroughly convincing that,
even after the revelation of Ms. Kuzma's true age, one major
newspaper reported, "Making the rounds in porn film circles is
the buzz that Traci Lords was legally an adult when she appeared
in several explicit films, and reports that she was only 15 are part
of a carefully planned marketing plot to remove her early films
from the shelf -- so they won't compete with new porn projects on
which she's working as producer." 37 Given that the Report of the
Special Committee on Pornography on Prostitution observes,
"Pornographic material coming into [Canada] comes overwhelmingly from the United States," 38 it is easy to see how one of
Ms. Kuzma's underage productions could have deceived the
Canadian public as thoroughly as it did the American public.
The final portion of the Criminal Code of Canada's
prohibition on child pornography is the furnishing of a second
defense:
No person shall be convicted of an offence under
this section if the act that is alleged to constitute the
36 Ron Russell, Law on Child Pornography Struck Down, THE Los ANGELES
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A3.
37 Michael Sneed and Kathy O'Malley, Making New Friends.... CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, July 30, 1986, at 12.
38 FRASER REPORT

at 87.
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offence (a) has a legitimate purpose related to the
administration of justice or to science, medicine,
education or art; and (b) does not pose an undue
risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen
years. 39
The exception provided here, very similar in nature to the Miller
test used by the United States in obscenity cases, is facially
sensible. While one may be led to ponder just how prophylactic
the term "art" is, this term may well be necessarily ambiguous so
as to allow a subjective determination that works like Tin Drum
are permissible while the mere feigning of artistic intent will not
alone provide grounds for an otherwise-prohibited work to garner
an exemption. However, it is not immediately clear just what
"undue risk of harm" is intended by this statutory language,
which surely does not speak to the prohibited acts of advocacy in
the statute, and is at odds with any banned material that features
actual children. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to proffer that
this defense is aimed at some variety of controlled situations scenarios not otherwise housed by the enumerated defenses, but
so thoroughly innocuous in nature as to not present any
meaningful social threat.

39

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(6) (1985).
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D. R. v. SHARPE

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 40 a core
component of the Constitution Act of 1982,41 provides in relevant
part, "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication." 42 The
Charter does, however, preemptively caveat, "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." 43 It is against these provisions that any limitation on
speech must be assessed, and it is this language that has given rise
to constitutional challenges of Canada's obscenity and child
pornography laws.
In 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court was faced with one
such constitutional challenge. In R. v. Butler,44 the Court,
considering the contours of this Charter provision, observed of
how a questionable cinematic work should be subjectively
assessed:
[In creating a film, regardless of its content, the
maker of the film is consciously choosing the
40 CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982; SCHEDULE B

[hereafter "CAN.

CONST"]; art. I.

41 "Canada does not have a single constitutional text akin to those of France,
Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands,

Spain,

or the United States.

Canada's

Constitution includes several components, including portions of the unwritten
constitution and common law of Great Britain, as well as two major texts of
constitutional import: the Constitution Act of 1867 (as amended) and the
Constitution Act of 1982, of which the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a
part." Pauline Cote and T. Jeremy Gunn, Essay: The Permissible Scope of
Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in: Canada, 19 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 685, 691 (2005).
42 CAN. CONST. art. 1. §2.

43 CAN. CONST. art. 1. §1.
44 R. v. Butler, 1992 S.C.R. LEXIS 44 (1992).
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particular images which together constitute the
film. In choosing his or her images, the creator of
the film is attempting to convey some meaning.
The meaning to be ascribed to the work cannot be
measured by the reaction of the audience, which, in
some cases, may amount to no more than physical
arousal or shock. Rather, the meaning of the work
derives from the fact that it has been intentionally
45
created by its author.
Widely hailed by the Canadian public, the impact of this ruling
was noted by one newspaper which reported, "In the press,
editorialists held out the hope that vice squads, armed with the
court's new guidelines on what was obscene, would go about their
business more astutely -- and stop seizing laughable
'pornography,' such as the film version of Gunther Grass' 'The Tin
Drum' [sicj."46
Some eight years later, the landmark case of R. v. Sharpe
came before the Court. Again concerned with the extent of the
Charter's reach, the judicial body this time addressed the
constitutionality - or lack thereof - of Canada's aforementioned
child pornography laws. The fundamental issue at hand was well
summarized in the majority ruling scribed by Chief Judge
McLachlin when he questioned, "Is Canada's law banning the
possession of child pornography constitutional or, conversely,
does it unjustifiably intrude on the constitutional right of
Canadians to free expression?" 47 The Court answered this
question mostly in the affirmative, but inserted a caveat that two
exceptions to the statute must be recognized for it to properly
comport with the guarantees of the Charter.
John Robin Sharpe was charged with two counts of
possession and two counts of possession for purposes of
41

Id. at 63.

46 Mary Williams Walsh,

Chill Hits Canada's Porn Law, Los

Sept. 6, 1993, at Al.
47 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, 33 (Can.).

ANGELES TIMES,
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48
distribution or sale under Canada's child pornography law.
Prior to trial, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
charging statutes, leading the government to argue that while the
possession charges may be in violation of the freedoms
guaranteed in the Charter, they are within the permissive confines
of the same document's preemptive caveat. 49 The trial judge ruled
the restrictions contained in the child pornography statute to be
50
impermissible, and this holding was upheld on initial appeal.
The case then came before the Supreme Court of Canada.
In an early portion of his analysis, Chief Judge McLachlin
observed candidly the balancing test inherent in deciding this
matter, "If we do not like an idea or an image, we are free to argue
against it or simply turn away. But, absent some constitutionally
adequate justification, we cannot forbid a person from expressing

it."51 This notion - the limited permissible means of addressing

otherwise-problematic varieties of speech - underscores the issue
before the Court, and foreshadows the duration of the opinion.
The court proceeds to examine an initial threshold matter:
whether child pornography is even within the confines of that
protected by the Charter. As the opinion notes, "Child
pornography does not generally contribute to the search for truth
or to Canadian social and political discourse. Some question
whether it engages even the value of self-fulfillment, beyond the
base aspect of sexual exploitation." 52 In lieu of focusing on this
troubling philosophical inquiry, however, the court takes note of a
more intellectually simplistic dilemma posed by the case at hand,
"The concern in this appeal, however, is that the law may
incidentally catch forms of expression that more seriously
implicate self-fulfillment and that do not pose a risk of harm to
children." 53
48

1Id. at 1.

49

Id. at2.

50 id.

51 Id. at 44.
52 Id. at 45-46.

53 Id. at 46.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

v. 16

The court goes on to identify some of this "incidental"
expressions that otherwise fall victim to the statute's over-breadth:
This definition of child pornography catches
depictions of imaginary human beings privately
created and kept by the creator. Thus, the
prohibition extends to visual expressions of
thought and imagination, even in the exceedingly
private realm of solitary creation and enjoyment.
As will be seen, the private and creative nature of
this expression, combined with the unlikelihood of
its causing harm to children, creates problems for
54
the law's constitutionality.
This concern of the court sheds further light upon the mysterious
second element of the statute's second affirmative defense, that
the suspect material "does not pose an undue risk of harm to
persons under the age of eighteen years." 55 The court here appears
to be suggesting that this subjective concept, used only to modify
an enumerated affirmative defense in the statute itself, may give
rise to other situations - outside the confines of this statutory
exception - where the freedoms of the Charter may trump
normative governmental concerns.
The decision, however, goes on to specifically address
certain varieties of content the court understands to not fall within
the scope of the statute. Specifically, Chief Judge McLachlin notes,
"Absent evidence indicating a dominant prurient purpose, a
photo of a child in the bath will not be caught. To secure a
conviction the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the 'dominant characteristic' of the picture is a depiction of the
sexual organ or anal region 'for a sexual purpose.' If there is a
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted." 56 Unlike the
aforementioned commentary on privately created - and held 14

5'
56

Id. at 56.

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(6)(b) (1985).
R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, 63-64 (Can.).

2009

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE TIN DRUMDILEMMA

229

imaginary depictions, this portion of the opinion does not appear
to constrain the relevant statute so much as to interpret the
legislative prose: it is contextually evident that the mere
photographic depiction of a child in the nude is not meant to fall
within the confines of child pornography and, ergo, the court sees
fit to making such abundantly clear.
Intriguingly, the court goes on to suggest that while child
pornography may be a lingual subset of pornography, it is to be
afforded a separate variety of legal treatment than obscenity.
Insinuating the clear distinction between prurient matter
involving adults and the same depicting children, the court
opines, "The definition of child pornography ... stands
independent of the defence of artistic merit ... I do not find it

incongruous to interpret the defence of artistic merit to the child
pornography offences differently from that developed under the
obscenity provisions." 57 This comment is important inasmuch as it
stands amidst an opinion that mainly serves to only define and, in
some cases, limit the child pornography statute. Here the court
appears to be suggesting that a traditional obscenity defense,
specifically provided for in the statute, should and will be
construed according to a different methodology in cases of child
pornography. This suggestion once again begs the Tin Drum
dilemma.
Proceeding with this analysis, differentiating child
pornography and obscenity, the court introduces a compelling
policy rationale for the stringent dichotomy:
Possession of child pornography increases the risk
of child abuse. It introduces risk, moreover, that
cannot be entirely targeted by laws prohibiting the
manufacture, publication and distribution of child
pornography. Laws against publication and
distribution of child pornography cannot catch the
private viewing of child pornography, yet private
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viewing may induce attitudes and arousals that
58
increase the risk of offence.
This finding moves the court's constitutional analysis in a clear
direction: the question of whether or not the applicable statute
infringes the freedoms provided in the Charter may be
presumably answered in the affirmative, but the law itself will be
nonetheless defended using the same document's preemptive
caveat. Indeed, the Charter itself provides these very freedoms
only exist, "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 59 The
thrust of the inquiry now shifts to whether the child pornography
ordinance in question serves to address behavior outside of those
"reasonable limits."
Proceeding into an examination of whether or not the
infringement is permissible within these constitutional confines,
the Canadian Supreme Court delineates a legal test remarkably
similar to the rigorous inquiry the Supreme Court of the United
States has come to reference as "strict scrutiny." 60 Specifically,
"The law must be reasonably tailored to its objectives; it must
impair the right no more than reasonably necessary, having
regard to the practical difficulties and conflicting tensions that
61
must be taken into account."
Addressing the first prong of this test, the court construes
the statute as being proper, "Inthe vast majority of the law's
applications, the costs it imposes on freedom of expression are
outweighed by the risk of harm to children. The Crown has met
the burden of demonstrating that the possession of child
pornography poses a reasoned apprehension of harm to children
and that the goal of preventing such harm is pressing and
58 Id.
at 92.
59 CAN. CONST. art. I. §1.
60 "In order to withstand strict

scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state
interest by the least restrictive means available." Bernal v. Fainter,467 U.S.
216,219 (1984).
61 Sharpe, I S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, 94 (Can.).
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substantial." 62 Essentially, and in light of its aforementioned
discussion of the pervasive harms of child pornography, the court
believes the material outlawed by this statute to be of such
substantial ill as to give rise to some infringement of the Charter.
The court, however, goes on to find that while the statute
does effectively catch material of a dangerous nature, it also
encompasses more innocuous content and, as such, is facially
overbroad. Chief Judge McLachlin writes:
However, the prohibition also captures in its sweep
materials that arguably pose little or no risk to
children, and that deeply implicate the freedoms
guaranteed under s. 2(b). The ban, for example,
extends to a teenager's sexually explicit recordings
of him or herself alone, or engaged in lawful sexual
activity, held solely for personal use. It also reaches
private materials, created by an individual
exclusively for him or herself, such as personal
journals, writings, and drawings. It is in relation to
these categories of materials that the costs of the
63
prohibition are most pronounced.
This condemnation of the law's broad reach continues:
The restriction imposed by s. 163.1(4) regulates
expression where it borders on thought. Indeed, it
is a fine line that separates a state attempt to control
the private possession of self-created expressive
materials from a state attempt to control thought or
opinion. The distinction between thought and
expression can be unclear. We talk of "thinking
aloud" because that is often what we do: in many
cases, our thoughts become choate only through
their expression. To ban the possession of our own
62
63

Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
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private musings thus falls perilously close to
64
criminalizing the mere articulation of thought.
The court, while clearly mindful of the grave implications of child
pornography - as evidenced by earlier portions of this same
opinion - appears equally concerned that a benevolentlyintentioned statute may contain inadvertently Orwellian
provisions. To be sure, this is not a manifestation of the Tin Drum
dilemma, but instead an intellectual indictment of any so-called
free society that dares to conflate thought with action, even when
applicable conceptualizations of "action" may be extended to
include mere speech. "Thought crimes" are a veritable taboo in
the Western world - for panoply of reasons - and the court here
seems significantly concerned that one such offense may be found
to exist within the Revised Statutes of Canada.
In closing, the court announces its remedy to this delicate
situation, electing to preserve the statute in question, but
imposing two restrictions on its potential impact:
The guarantees provided in ss. 2(b) and 7 of the
Charter require the recognition of two exceptions to
s. 163.1(4), where the prohibition's intrusion into
free expression and privacy is most pronounced
and its benefits most attenuated: (a) The first
exception protects the possession of expressive
material created through the efforts of a single
person and held by that person alone, exclusively
for his or her own personal use. This exception
protects deeply private expression, such as
personal journals and drawings, intended solely for
the eyes of their creator. (b) The second exception
protects a person's possession of visual recordings
created by or depicting that person, but only where
these recordings do not depict unlawful sexual
activity, are held only for private use, and were
64

Id. at 103-04.
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These two limitations appear clearly targeted at the
aforementioned concern regarding thought crimes, and the
continued propagation of a Western society that values deeply the
forgiving realms of privacy. To the extent journals and similarly
therapeutic modes of private expression prove personally
redeeming to Canada's citizenry, the court feels any attempt to
bring their unobtrusive contents into the prohibited realm of child
pornography would be in contravention of the Charter.
The second condition imposed by the Court is slightly
more curious; the language used by Chief Judge McLachlin
appears to invite protection chiefly for productions created by and for - legal minors who desire to memorialize their sexual
traits or exploits through a visual medium. Since this exemption is
limited to the depiction of activities that are themselves legal, this
language, when considered in concert with Canada's
aforementioned statutory rape law, 66 appears to only impact solo
productions, and couple or group productions where all involved
parties are between the ages of 16 and 18.
Given the in-depth treatment of the child pornography
statutes afforded by R. v. Sharpe, and the court's thorough survey
of the potential issues presented by the law, the relatively
microscopic finding that only two narrow exemptions need be
made seems peculiar. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - by
identifying, discussing and vividly professing the mandatory
allowance of these two additional defenses, the court is inherently
suggesting the permissiveness of all other conceivable defenses
not enumerated to be unnecessary. The child pornography
prohibition is long, broad and far-reaching - even going so far as
to deem the mere advocacy of prescribed acts to be impermissible.
Yet only four viable exemptions exist - the two included in the
statute and the two created by the court.
Id. at 119.
66 R.S.C, ch. C-46, § 151 (1985).
65
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E. THE UNITED STATES' CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW

The United States' prohibition on child pornography is
found in a code section titled "Sexual Exploitation and Other
Abuses of Children." 67 While the language of this statute has
significant historical roots, 68 it was meaningfully modified by the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), which, in
relevant part, updated the law to address modern technological
advances. 69 The statutes addressing child pornography exist
separate and aside from the United States federal law on
70
obscenity.
While this article is predominately concerned with a
narrow definitional portion of the CPPA, the broader American
prohibition on child pornography is relevant in that it is the
language on which the CPPA acts. The United States Code
meaningfully addresses this topic in seven parts. Given that
Congress' legislative powers over this subject are derived from the
Commerce Clause, 71 each provision contains a certain modicum of
jurisdictional language, which is beyond the scope of this article's
foCUS.7 2

Each provision shares the common overhanging modifier
of "Any person who," 73 and goes on to enumerate a specific act or
61 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2260A (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
68 See generally Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-225; Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292; Child
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690.
69 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(b) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008
amendments).
70 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460-1466 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
71U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.

72 To be sure, the jurisdictional issues raised by these provisions are fascinating,
and certainly fodder enough for diligent academic inquiry. Their exclusion from
this article should not be viewed as a qualitative judgment as to their relative
importance, but, rather, merely an effort to tightly focus this examination on
constitutional matters of speech, not jurisdiction.
7, 18 U.S.C.A § 2252A(a) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
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acts that "shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)," 74 with
75
that subsection defining the punitive consequences of such acts.
The first excerpt touches "any person who knowingly mails, or
transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or
foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
76
by any means, including by computer, any child pornography."
Truly simplistic, this language serves as a blanket inclusion of
those who use interstate commerce to move child pornography.
The second provision, utilizing the same jurisdictional
language, touches persons who "receive or distribute" 77 child
pornography or "any material that contains child pornography." 78
The third excerpt touches "any person who knowingly reproduces
any child pornography," 79 or who "advertises, promotes, presents,
distributes, or solicits... (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of
an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 80 The
specific description of the latter two forms of material, as opposed
to the generic use of the term "child pornography," which is a
defined term, 81 essentially serves to broaden significantly the
scope of this particular prohibition beyond that affecting those
who move, receive or distribute suspect material. In essence, a
wider net is cast to allow the punishment of those in the business
of advertising, promoting, presenting, distributing or soliciting
material depicting a minor in a sexually explicit act. This language
is also significant in that, like the Canadian statute, it relies on the
term "depiction" as a means of encompassing the visualization of
74

id.

7118 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
76 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
77 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
78 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
79 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
80 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
",18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
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acts both real and imagined. The use of "actual minor" in the
second provision, juxtaposed to its absence from the first,
confirms this reality. This prosaic election, as will be shown later
herein, proves important to the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free
82
Speech Coalition.
The fourth provision touches any person who "knowingly
83
sells or possesses with the intent to sell any child pornography"
within the jurisdictional confines of the statute, 84 while the fifth
excerpt uses near-identical language to include any person who
"knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view,
any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or
any other material that contains an image of child pornography." 85
Much like the first provision, these excerpts contain meanings
evident in their simplistic text. The seventh provision is similarly
ordinary in its language, touching any person who "knowingly
produces with intent to distribute, or distributes, by any means,
including a computer, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, child pornography that is an adapted or modified
86
depiction of an identifiable minor."
The sixth excerpt, however, is both the most complex and
topical for purposes of this article. Subject to the usual litany of
jurisdictional restrictions, it affects any person who "knowingly
distributes, offers, sends, or provides to a minor any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer generated image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, where such visual
depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct." 87 The critical aspect of this language, for
purposes of this study, is "or computer generated image or
picture," a component that was introduced by the CPPA.88 It is
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008
84
[d.
85 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008
86 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008
87 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(6) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008
88
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
82
83

amendments).
amendments).
amendments).
amendments).
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this terminology that gave rise to the controversy underpinning
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.89

F. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COA LION

As obscenity law has evolved in the United States, the
Supreme Court has taken care to legally differentiate child
pornography from other brands of prurient material, ensuring the
exploitation of children not be subject to the relatively liberal
standards of the test enunciated in Miller v. California.90 In 1982,
the Court observed:
The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment
found in the relevant literature, is that the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child. That judgment, we
think, easily passes muster under the First
Amendment. 91
This assertion suggests the Court to view obscenity laws and child
pornography laws to serve a fundamentally different compelling
government interest.
Thus, while American case law suggests both obscenity
and child pornography to be permissibly regulated, despite the
First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech," 92 the rationale for the
abrogation of these two suspect forms of speech is fundamentally
different. Relevantly, this means that the mere existence of artistic
merit - a conclusion that denies a finding of obscenity under the
Miller test - will not confer protected status upon a work of child

9

See id.
90 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).

91New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
92 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

v. 16

pornography. In making this distinction, the Supreme Court
noted:
The Miller standard, like all general definitions of
what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect
the State's particular and more compelling interest
in prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children. Thus, the question under
the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person bears no connection to the issue of whether
a child has been physically or psychologically
harmed in the production of the work. Similarly, a
sexually explicit depiction need not be "patently
offensive" in order to have required the sexual
exploitation of a child for its production. In
addition, a work which, taken on the whole,
contains serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value may nevertheless embody the
hardest core of child pornography. "It is irrelevant
to the child [who has been abused] whether or not
the material . . .has a literary, artistic, political or
social value." 93
With this distinction, however, the dilemma of Tin Drum is once
again presented. If literary, artistic, political or social value is to be
of no consideration, then the line between an internationally
award-winning film and a black-market piece of pure exploitation
is suddenly blurred to a spectacular degree.
Seemingly cognizant, however, of this distinction between
obscenity and child pornography standards, Congress passed the
CPPA. The act made several meaningful changes to the existing
child pornography laws, but its definitional adjustment proved
most notable. In addition to the inclusion of "or computer
93 Ferber, 458

U.S. at 761 (quoting in part Memorandum of Assemblyman
Lasher in Support of NY CLS Penal § 263.15).
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generated image or picture" in the sixth excerpt of prohibited
material discussed above, the very definition of "child
pornography" was changed to cover:
[A] visual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video, picture, or computer or computergenerated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-- (A) the
production of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; (B) such visual depiction is a digital
image, computer image, or computer-generated
image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C)
such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is
94
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 95
With the inclusion of "computer-generated image" both here and
in the list of prohibited matter, a veritable issue arose: the
rationale underpinning a different form of consideration for child
pornography than ordinary obscenity - i.e., the abuse of children was no longer applicable.
Realizing this new digital inclusion, as well as the CPPA's
addition of other material that does not involve actual minors, the
Free Speech Coalition - a California-based group of persons in the
adult entertainment industry - and panoply of other parties
brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of the law, claiming
it to be impermissibly overbroad. 96 The case was dismissed in
94 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2008 amendments).
95The term "computer-generated" is hyphenated in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) but not
in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(6). There does not appear to be any meaningful rationale
for this distinction, nor should it be construed for analytical purposes as
anything more than a drafting inconsistency.
96 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002).
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District Court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, with certiorari then being sought - and
granted - by the Supreme Court. 97 In defining the scope of the
question at hand, the Supreme Court noted:
We consider in this case whether the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),
abridges the freedom of speech. The CPPA extends
the federal prohibition against child pornography
to sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors but were produced without using any real
children. The statute prohibits, in specific
circumstances, possessing or distributing these
images, which may be created by using adults who
look like minors or by using computer imaging. 98
Ultimately, the Court found these provisions of the CPPA to be
unconstitutional, eloquently observing, "The Government may
not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful
speech. Protected speech does not become unprotected merely
because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the
reverse." 99
In reaching this finding, the Court examined Congress'
rationale for expanding existing child pornography laws,
analyzing the substantive harm addressed as well as the
methodology of the legislative response. Specifically, the Court
noted:
In its legislative findings, Congress recognized that
there are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit
desires for children and commit criminal acts to
gratify the impulses. Congress also found that
surrounding the serious offenders are those who
Id. at 243-44.
98 Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).
'9 Id. at 255.
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flirt with these impulses and trade pictures and
written accounts of sexual activity with young
children.100
This rationale helps shed light on the inclusion of material that
involves youthful-appearing adults and computer-generated
matter - Congress is not merely concerned with the exploitation of
children that occurs during the production of child pornography
but, indeed, the exploitation that social theory suggests to occur as
a result of child pornography. In a sense, the legislative intent
suggests that prurient depictions of minors are actually a form of
enabling the exploitation of minors - the material newly covered
by the CPPA is almost tantamount to a so-called gateway drug in
that the compelling rationale for its prohibition concerns largely
the potential for future acts of a more severe criminal caliber. The
Court, however, proved unconvinced that this theory allowed
sufficient justification for the law, writing, "The prospect of crime,
however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected
speech."101
Understanding these prohibitions to be accordingly
impermissible under child pornography jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court proceeded to consider whether the subject
material might still be subject to prohibition under ordinary
obscenity standards. However, as Justice Kennedy writes for the
Court:
The CPPA, however, extends to images that appear
to depict a minor engaging in sexually explicit
activity without regard to the Miller requirements.
The materials need not appeal to the prurient
interest. Any depiction of sexually explicit activity,
no matter how it is presented, is proscribed. The
CPPA applies to a picture in a psychology manual,
as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual
100

10

Id. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
Id. at 245.
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abuse. It is not necessary, moreover, that the image
be patently offensive. Pictures of what appear to be
17-year-olds engaging in sexually explicit activity
do not in every case contravene community
102
standards.
This comment of the Court's suggests that Congress may, indeed,
proceed with the legislative prohibition of material that feigns
child pornography through the use of youthful-appearing actors
or digital means, but that such a prohibition must conform to the
generally more permissive artistic standards of Miller. In essence,
Justice Kennedy is noting that the CPPA's expanded definition of
child pornography is, for legal purposes, errant - only material
involving actual minors may be construed as child pornography,
and that merely depicting minors shall, instead, be construed as
obscenity. From a legislative point of view, it matters not if this
secondary class of material is prohibited as child pornography,
obscenity or anything else - the Court will treat it as obscenity.
Insisting upon the application of the Miller standard,
largely because of its contextual exemption for socially
meritorious works, the Court addresses (albeit not specifically) a
portion of the dilemma posed by Tin Drum:
[T]eenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of
children ... have inspired countless literary works.
William Shakespeare created the most famous pair
of teenage lovers, one of whom is just 13 years of
age. In the drama, Shakespeare portrays the
relationship as something splendid and innocent,
but not juvenile. The work has inspired no less than
40 motion pictures, some of which suggest that the
teenagers
consummated
their
relationship.
Shakespeare may not have written sexually explicit
scenes for the Elizabethean audience, but were
modern directors to adopt a less conventional
102

Id. at 246.
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approach, that fact alone would not compel the
103
conclusion that the work was obscene.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, strongly objects
to this rationale of the Court, noting, "[W]e should be loath to
construe a statute as banning film portrayals of Shakespearian
tragedies, without some indication -- from text or legislative
history -- that such a result was intended." 104 (In an apparent
demonstration of strict constructionism, Justice Scalia, who
otherwise joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, makes a
105
specific point of not endorsing this portion of the opinion.)
Still, it is not this rationale that moves the Court to declare
the relevant legislative text incompatible with existing normative
methods of judicially examining child pornography statutes. The
artistic controversy only emerges once this finding is accepted and
the Supreme Court proceeds with an obscenity analysis as per
Miller, and under this rationale the law is nonetheless declared
unconstitutional as overbroad. The CPPA, while surely wellintentioned, ultimately proved fatally flawed for its prohibition of
otherwise-legitimate speech as a means of preempting the
occurrence of future acts.

G. COMMENT
In his order of October 10, 1998, United State District Judge
Ralph G. Thompson found, "the inclusion of the three suggestive
scenes in issue in a film which does not have the dominant theme
of appeal to prurient interest and is a serious bona fide artistic
work, does not warrant its subjection to the criminal penalties of
the child pornography statute." 10 6 With this finding, Tin Drum was
once again legal in Oklahoma.
103Id. at 247 (citing Romeo and Juliet, act I, sc. 2, 1. 9 ("She hath not seen the
change of fourteen years"); Romeo and Juliet (B. Luhrmann director, 1996)).
104 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 271 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106 Oklahoma v. Blockbuster Videos, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22096, at 18.
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Still, the very fact that this Oscar-winning production was
forced through the rigors of the judicial process suggests
American child pornography jurisprudence to have reached a
point of such thorough blurring as to render questionable works
of acclaimed artistic merit. This has led New York University
School of Law Associate Professor Amy Adler 07 to observe, "If we
pushed the definition in the evolving case law to the extreme, it
seems to threaten all pictures of unclothed children, whether lewd
or not, and even pictures of clothed children, if they meet the hazy
definition of 'lascivious' or 'lewd."' 08
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Ashcroft, published after
Ms. Adler's commentary, does little to alleviate the concerns
raised by Tin Drum - the actor in that movie was an actual child,
not a youthful-appearing adult or computer simulation.109 In fact,
despite portraying a boy of 16 years, the actor was only 11 years
old at the time of his performance.11 0 Had the scenes' filming
required actual sexual contact, the end product may still be
prohibited matter in the American heartland."' Indeed, if the
young actor had actually been required to engage in genuine
sexual activity as part of the role, the debate over whether or not
the film constitutes child pornography would be secondary, with
the movie itself being evidence of another crime: statutory rape. In
Canada the sexual touching of anyone under the age of 16 is
illegal1 12 and American state laws serve to prohibit the same
113
variety of activity.

Ms. Adler is now a Professor of Law, but was an Associate Professor of Law
at the time she published this quoted material. Compare Amy Adler, The
PerverseLaw of ChildPornography,101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001) with Amy
Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108 (2005).
107

108

Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of ChildPornographyat 240.

109

Blockbuster Videos, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22096, at 7 n.2.

110 Id.

111 Id. at 8.
112

R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 151 (1985).

113

See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code § 21.11 (2007), D.C. Code § 22-3008 (2008).
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This reality is compelling inasmuch as it demonstrates
how most child pornography is already illegal. Whether a camera
is in the room or not, the prurient touching of a child is illegal.
Further, to the extent that act of molestation is arranged by others
(directors, distributors, etc.), they are part and parcel of a
conspiracy to commit the underlying crime, meaning they, too,
can be charged under other portions of the penal code. Existing
laws also encompass obscenity. Black market child pornography,
generally, is obscene - it is difficult to envision an overwhelming
quantity of matter containing redeeming literary, artistic, political
or scientific value being swapped about on street corners and in
underground cyber-exchanges.
Accordingly, it seems the variety of content in the United
States and Canada that is criminal only under child pornography
laws is not only relatively scarce but, indeed, precisely that
ambiguous sort of matter that each country's high court has
struggled to address. For a prurient image, production or other
material to not contain evidence of any criminal offenses, and to
also not prove obscene, it must - by logical deduction - be

something that does not sexually harm a minor and that is of
sufficient social character to not be obscene. If the act is legal to
perform or view in person, and its visual preservation isn't
obscene, it seems counter-intuitive to outlaw its second-hand
viewing.
If society does not deem the penalties for such underlying
offenses sufficient to address, and deter, child pornography, it is
rather simple to amend relevant statutes. The sentences for
obscenity can include an enhancement for material that includes
children, and the punishment for statutory rape - as well as other
forms of child molestation or endangerment - can, too, contain
enhancement clauses for when the act is memorialized with intent
to distribute. This jurisprudential approach would encompass the
same seedy lineup of characters already indictable under child
pornography laws - with the possible exception of customers.
With regard to those customers, arguably the least harmful
link in the chain already, it may be that criminalization is in error.
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There are, generically, two varieties of persons who possess and
consume child pornography: Those who take a prurient interest in
its contents, and those who do not. The latter variety of persons
are largely similar to those who own, rent or view a copy of Tin
Drum in that while it may be argued that they have run afoul of
the letter of the law, they certainly have not violated its spirit.
Philosophically, the punishment of these individuals is
114
problematic.
As for those customers who do posses and consume child
pornography for prurient purposes, the analysis is more
troubling. On one hand, there can be little question as to their
moral culpability - to derive any modicum of pleasure from the
degradation of children is decidedly repulsive. Yet given the
premium both the United States and Canada place on free speech
and personal privacy, it does bear pondering whether their acts
should be criminalized. The harms perpetrated through mere
possession of child pornography are inherently secondary - the
possessor is not the one who harmed a child or created obscene
matter. 115 But for the obvious moral concerns, this lone viewer is
almost indistinguishable from the curious citizen who watches
one of the many troubling beheading videos now available on a
fairly wide basis. While the intent behind the viewing, and
reaction, are surely different, to punish based solely on these
elements would be to propagate the variety of thought crimes
long ago shunned in the Western world.
It is argued that those who view child pornography may
have a propensity to then pursue acts of sexual deviation with
actual children. These subsequent acts, however, are already
illegal. To punish based solely on the potential - no matter how
great - of their occurrence would be not merely Orwellian but,
indeed, an outright affront of the democratic principles of free will
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V, ch. 4 (350 B.C.E.).
course, to the extent that anyone who possesses child pornography is also
the creator of the material, or part of the aforementioned conspiracy, they are
already subject to criminal penalty and, thus, fall outside the class of individuals
being discussed here.
114

115 Of

2009

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE TIA DRUMDILEMMA

247

that provide a foundation for much of Canadian and American
society. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. As the Supreme Court of the
United States eloquently observes in Ashcroft, "The mere tendency
of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for
banning it. The government 'cannot constitutionally premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts."'116
There is, of course, a policy reason for criminalizing
possession of child pornography: it deters the purchase of such
exploitive matter and, in doing so, lessens the financial incentive
that drives production. Yet if advanced, liberal societies like the
United States and Canada are to stand in opposition to the
concept of punishing one's thoughts, the ability to distinguish
between those who view acts of child exploitation and those who
view other illegal acts is greatly diminished. It is one thing to
declare the photograph, recording or other instrument to be
evidence of criminality; it is altogether a different thing to declare
that those who voluntarily view such evidence are, themselves,
guilty of a crime.
Canada and the United States both have an altogether
proper, strong national interest in the protection of their children.
As one scholar notes, "Children occupy a privileged position
within liberalism, because they are deemed to lack the capacity to
make their own choices and decisions." 117 It may also be
contended that each nation has a certain interest in prohibiting
obscene matter from corrupting the morals of its population. Yet
each of these objectives is theoretically achieved through laws
separate and apart from child pornography statutes. In this
regard, the variety of legislation discussed in both Ashcroft and
Sharpe is largely surplusage - the further criminalization of
already prohibited acts. Accordingly, it bears considering why
either nation should tolerate the persistence of such a blurred
116

Ashcroft 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting in part Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,

566 (1969)).
117 Susan M. Easton, The Problem of Pornography: Regulation and the Right to
Free Speech 23 (1994).
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realm of law, full of faults and moral contention, if a specific
prohibition on child pornography is not even necessary to achieve
the desired ends.

